Author(s) :

Umar Saleh; Saheed Babajide Owonikoko.

Volume/Issue :

Abstract :

The Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), otherwise called Boko Haram and its splinter group, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have sustained a protracted insurgency that has affected the wider Lake Chad Basin region since the mid-2000s. Despite that the two factions emerged from the same group and locality, scholars and policy analysts frequently analyse them as a single security phenomenon. They ignore their differences in regards to mode of operations, violence patterns and the way and manner they relate to local populations. This study made use of a qualitative comparative case study design, obtaining data from key informant interviews and focus group discussions from Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Correspondingly, data were collected from conflict event datasets and relevant secondary sources. Findings show that JAS continued to indiscriminately launch attacks against innocent people of all faiths. While ISWAP developed into a more structured and adaptive armed group that strategize its attacks on military targets. At the same time employ coercive mechanisms to exert control over locals. In spite of it selective targets, ISWAP’s impact on economies, transportations, and overall livelihoods posed a greater and lasting threat to both state and human security. Based on the Securitization framework, the paper argues that it is inadequate to rely on civilian-related casualty data solely to explain the complex security dynamics in the Lake Chad region. Effective security restoration in the region requires further strategies that integrate military intelligence-driven operations, institutional restoration, civilian protections, and socio-economic recovery to enable people to rebuild their lives. Keywords: Boko Haram, ISWAP, JAS, regional security, Lake Chad Basin, counterinsurgency

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